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ii.
II.

THE DEFENDANTS VIOLATED CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON
THE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING
DEPRIVATIONS OF PROPERTY AND LIBERTY INTERESTS
DIRECTLY UNDER THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Order denying the Plaintiff and Appellant's
Motion for Reconsideration and the Order granting the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss are based upon questions of
law or mixed questions of law and fact as the Plaintiff
and Appellant's Amended Complaint was dismissed on a
U.R.C.P. 12(b) Motion to Dismiss.
When reviewing a decision of a lower court reviewing
de novo an order of an administrative agency, the
Appellate Court acts as if it were reviewing the
administrative agency decision de novo or directly.
Cowling v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 177 Utah Adv. Rep.
6 (Utah 1992).
Consequently, when reviewing a Motion to Dismiss
based on a de novo review of an administrative decision
under Rule 12(b), an Appellate court must accept the
material factual allegations of the complaint as true, and
the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it
appears beyond reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would
entitle him to relief.

Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S.Ct. 975,

-xii-

979 (1990); Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390
(10th Cir. 1990); Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795
P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1990); Provo City Corp, v, Willden,
768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989); City Arrow Industries, Inc.
v. Zions First Nat 1 ! Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988).
Likewise, this court is obliged to construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
appellant, and to indulge all reasonable inferences in his
favor, Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107
(Ut.App. 1990), and any questions of mixed fact and law
which involve primarily a consideration of legal
principles are reviewed de novo.

In Re Ruti-Sweetwater,

Inc., 836 F.2d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988).

-xiii-

Determinative Constitutional, Statutory Provisions
Regulations
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
rules or regulations whose interpretation is believed to
be solely determinative of the outcome of this case. Many
Constitutional provisions, provisions of the Utah Code,
and Internal regulations of the Defendants are, however
relevant to the disposition of this case, and will be so
noted.

-xiv-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
NATURE OF THE ACTION
This is a Section 1983 civil rights action, and

an

action for direct enforcement of specific constitutional
rights under the United States and Utah Constitutions, on
behalf of a secondary science teacher to recover his
teaching certificate, damages and attorneys fees as a
result of the Defendants1 denial of the Plaintiff's
clearly established rights to substantive and procedural
due process. This action involves unique constitutional
due process issues regarding pre and post suspension
revocation hearings, substantive due process issues
relative to revocation hearings, and the role of the
district court in fashioning remedies.
B.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
This action was filed March 20, 1989. During the
course of the proceedings, the District Court issued five
(5) Minute Entry decisions.

The Decisions were based

upon:
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction:
Issued April 3, 1989, and April 10, 1989, (District
Court Index at p. 145, 155-156).
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's damages
prior to discovery: Issued May 15, 1989, and May 16,

1989, (Index Ibid, at p. 177, 178).
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment:
Issued November 1, 1989, and November 9, 1989, (Index
Ibid, at p. 256, 257-259).
Defendants' Motion for Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint: Issued August 28, 1991, and November 26,
1991 (Supp. Index Ibid, at p. 474-476, 490-492).
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration: Issued
December 9, 1991, and March 16, 1992, (Supp. Index
Ibid, at p. 493, 500-501).
In summary, the District Court held that the
Plaintiff had not made a showing of irreparable harm and
denied the Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Index
Ibid, at p. 145, 155-156), granted the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss relative to the Plaintiff's civil rights claims
prior to discovery as barred by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act (Ibid, at p. 177-178), and denied the
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment concerning
the Defendants' use of expunged and sealed records in
revoking the Plaintiff's certificate to teach (Ibid, at p.
256, 257-259).

During the proceedings below, the

Plaintiff conducted discovery in the form of
interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for
production of documents.

(Ibid, at 260-326).

The Plaintiff then filed a successful interlocutory
appeal to this court. Ambus v. Utah State Board of
Education, 800 P.2d 811 (Utah 1990).

- 2-

Following this

decision, the Plaintiff

refiled his Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment and the Motion was granted by the trial
court•

As a consequence the Plaintiff's teaching

certificate was restored, but without other relief, and
the Plaintiff was given thirty (30) days to file an
amended complaint to demonstrate what damages, if any,
were caused by the wrongful revocation of his certificate.
(Ibid, at p. 356-360).
Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed his amended
complaint.

The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the

amended complaint, and the Court granted the Defendants1
Motion to Dismiss by Minute Entry, without memorandum
decision, findings, or any indication of the basis for the
ruling.

(Ibid, at p. 474-476).

Prior to the Court issuing a final decision, the
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration based upon an
intervening United States Supreme Court decision , which
was contrary to the holding of the trial court. The
Defendants responded in opposition and filed a prepared
order.

(Index Ibid, at p. 493, 500-501).

The Court

denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hafer v. Melo,
L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) .

U.S.

- 3-

, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116

c.
RELEVANT FACTS
This is a civil rights action pursuant to Title 42
U.S.C., Sections 1983, 1988, and Title 28 U.S.C., Sections
1331 and 1343, also pursuant to the United States and Utah
Constitutions, and directly under the due process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Article I Sec.
7, 11, of Utah's Constitution for direct enforcement
thereof, where the Plaintiff originally sought de novo
judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceedings,
pursuant to Section 63-46(b)-15 U.C.A. 1953, as amended;
and also pursuant to Section 78-3-4(5) U.C.A. (1953), as
amended, seeking redress for procedural and substantive
constitutional, and statutory violations.

(Addendum A ) .

The Plaintiff received his Standard Secondary
Teaching Certificate with biological and Physical Science
endorsements (on August 13, 1981) listing with the
Defendants his permanent address, at 3316 El Serrito Dr.,
SLC, UT

841092

(Index at p. 281). Thereafter the

Plaintiff commenced teaching in Utah's secondary schools,
attained tenured status and until the events in this case,
the Plaintiff's certificate was valid in all respects and

Except as specifically noted, the following facts are
undisputed as material factual allegations contained
within the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Exhibits
attached thereto.
-4-

entitled him to teach in any public school in the State of
Utah or in any other State having reciprocity.
In August of 1982, the Plaintiff was approved for
employment with Granite School District, listing the same
permanent address as with the Defendants USBE in 1981.
(Index at p. 146-147).
The Plaintiff's Certificate provided the Plaintiff
with a protected property and liberty interest.

The

Defendants do not dispute that the Plaintiff's certificate
was both suspended and then revoked without notice or
hearing of any kind.

(Index at p. 402-420).

The Defendants Utah State Board of Education (herein
"USBE") are charged by the Utah Constitution, Article X
Sec. 8, and by Utah law, Section 53A-1-401 U.C.A. (1953),
as amended, with the general supervision and control of
the Utah public school system.

As part of the Defendant

USBE's duties of general supervision and control, it, and
it alone, has the authority to issue and revoke teaching
certificates pursuant to Section 53A-6-101 et. seq. U.C.A.
(1953), as amended, see Section 53A-6-104 U.C.A. (1953) as
amended.
The Defendants Utah Professional Practices Advisory
Commission (herein "UPPAC"), agents of the Defendant USBE,
have authority to receive and act upon complaints
involving immoral or unprofessional conduct, and to make
-5-

"recommendations" to the Defendant USBE to revoke or
suspend a state teaching certificate.

Section 53A-7-101

et. seq. U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
The Plaintiff taught school in Utah until February
19, 1987, when his employer, Granite School District
terminated his employment.

Through the grievance process,

the Plaintiff was reinstated.

Granite School District

refused to reinstate him and Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in
the United States District Court for the District of Utah,
3
Civil No. C88-0059G in December 1987.

From September

1987 through June 1988 the Plaintiff taught school in
Arizona, and at all times material herein, his permanent
address was still valid.

(Index at p. 146-147).

On January 27, 1988 the Tribune published a news
account of Plaintiff's federal lawsuit as a result of
Granite School District's refusal to reinstate the
Plaintiff.

(Index at p. 275). Based upon these news

accounts, Defendant Roger Mouritsen, filed a Complaint
against the Plaintiff before the Defendant UPPAC on March
18, 1988. The basis of the Defendants' action was the
Tribune news article which indicated that the Plaintiff
was allegedly arrested for drug distribution upon the
This action is pending in the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Oral argument was completed on March 9, 1992 and
a decision is expected soon.
- 6 -

allegations of an informer who was an addict and felon.
(Index at p. 59).
The alleged events occurred during off-duty hours at
the Plaintiff's residence.

The charges were subsequently

dismissed and expunged, well over one year prior to the
Defendants' complaint.

The complaint of March 18, 1988

did not specify if the Plaintiff was charged with
immorality, unprofessional or incompetent conduct, or with
evident unfitness for service.
Under Section 53A-7-111 U.C.A. (1953), as amended,
the Defendant USBE through its agent Defendant Roger
Mouritsen, and Defendant UPPAC were required to provide
notice of hearing to be sent to the Plaintiff's last known
address and to the permanent address shown on the records
of the commission.

(Emphasis Added).

The Defendant Roger

C. Mouritsen allegedly mailed a copy of the Complaint to
the Plaintiff on March 18, 1988 to the address of 831 E.
Stratford Ave., SLC, UT
returned unclaimed.

84106 and it was allegedly
4

(Index at p. 59-63)

On April 11, 1988, the Defendant Roger Mouritsen,
allegedly mailed a notice of hearing for May 20, 1988 to
Alleged mail receipts, including the receipt for
certified mail form, and copy of the envelope proferred by
the Defendants, do not show an official postmark, postage,
certified fee, and or date stamped by the U.S. Postal
Service. (Index at p. 62-63).
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the Plaintiff at the same address of 831 E. Stratford
Ave., SLC, UT 84106.5

(Index at p. 64-67)

Unknown to the Plaintiff, the Defendant UPPAC
conducted a hearing on May 20, 1988. The UPPAC, without
inquiring if notice of hearing had been sent to the
permanent address of the Plaintiff, recommended that the
Plaintiff's Certificate be suspended until such time as
the Plaintiff

requested a hearing.

The UPPAC tendered no

findings of fact, reasons, or conclusions of law for this
action.

(Index at p. 68-69).

Likewise, unknown to the Plaintiff, on July 12, 1988,
the Defendant UPPAC, and Defendant USBE Certification
Committee held another hearing attended by Defendants of
the USBE, M. Richard Maxfield, and Darlene Hutchison.
Again, no notice of hearing, or even alleged attempt of
notice was provided to the Plaintiff at his permanent
address listed with the Defendants.

The Defendant

Certification Committee recommended to the Defendant USBE

Likewise, the Defendants proferred alleged mail
receipts, including the receipt for certified mail, and a
copy of the envelopes, again none of which show an
official postmark, postage, certified fee, and or date
stamped by the U.S. Postal Service, which were supposed
returned unclaimed.
The Defendants admit that at no time was the complaint
or notice of hearing sent to the permanent address the
Plaintiff listed with the Defendants in 1981, as required
by Section 53A-7-111 U.C.A. (1953), as amended. (Index at
p. 130, 281).
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that the Plaintiff's Certificate be revoked rather than
suspended.

The Certification Committee tendered no

findings of fact, reasons, or conclusions of law for this
action.

(Index at p. 70).

On August 24, 1988, Defendant Roger Mouritsen,
contacted the Plaintiff's employer, Salt Lake City School
District, who in turn notified the Plaintiff that the
Defendant USBE had revoked the Plaintiff's Certificate on
August 19, 1988.

(Index at P. 71) At this time, the Salt

Lake City School District terminated the Plaintiff's
employment because of the Defendants' allegations that the
Plaintiff had no valid teaching certificate.

There were

no findings of fact, reasons, or conclusions of law, and
this was the first occasion that the Plaintiff learned
that action had been taken, or was pending, concerning his
certificate.

(Index at p. 71).

On August 24, 1988, pursuant to Defendant
Superintendent James Moss' instructions, the Plaintiff
surrendered his Certificate on August 26, 1988 under
protest because Defendants' revocation was in violation of
due process of law.

(Index at p. 72).

On September 26, 1988, the Plaintiff was notified
that the Defendants had scheduled a hearing "to consider
reinstatement of your teaching certificate."
73) .
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(Index at p.

On September 27, 1988, Plaintiff personally and
through counsel, demanded that Plaintiff's Certificate be
restored prior to any hearing both by constitutional and
statutory prescription, that the Plaintiff was entitled to
due process before his certificate was revoked and not
after, and that Plaintiff be granted a de novo hearing.
(Index at p. 76-78).
On October 13, 1988, Plaintiff's counsel again
demanded that Plaintiff's Certificate be restored prior to
a de novo hearing.

(Index at p. 80-82) On October 20,

1988 the Defendants provided an informal hearing to
"reconsider" whether the Plaintiff's certificate should be
revoked.

The Defendants failed to return the Plaintiff's

Certificate prior to the hearing.

The hearing was

declared by the hearing officer to be an "informal
hearing" and was conducted as such under the Defendants'
Rules for Adjudicative Proceedings. No official record
was maintained.

At the hearing, the Plaintiff provided

specific written objections which included lack of due
process.

(Index at p. 83-86).

Additionally, the

Plaintiff objected to the hearing unless Plaintiff's
certificate was restored and was then granted a de novo
hearing.

(Ibid).

On January 5, 1989, the Defendant UPPAC hearing
committee Wenzzel, Bosch, Jaussi, and Rasband, through the
- 10 -

hearing officer, Defendant Mladejovsky issued its decision
recommending that the decision of the State Board of
Education be upheld.

No findings of fact, reasons, or

conclusions of law were provided for this action.

(Index

at p. 88)
On March 16, 1989, the Plaintiff was informed of the
decision by transmittal letter from Defendant
Superintendent Moss.

This letter also stated that the

Defendant USBE also accepted the hearing panel's decision.
No findings of fact, reasons, or conclusions of law were
provided for this action.

(Index at p. 89).

On March 20, 1989, Plaintiff requested that the
Defendants stay its Order revoking Plaintiff's
certificate.

On March 21, 1989 Defendant Moss denied the

Plaintiff's request for a stay of revocation pending
judicial review.

(Index at p. 90) No findings of fact,

reasons, or conclusions were stated.

Subsequent to the

filing of the initial complaint on March 20, 1989, the
course of the proceedings are as previously described.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendants' policy or practice failed to provide
constitutionally adequate notices of hearing.

The

suspension and revocation of the Plaintiff's certificate
violated clearly established federal and state
constitutional and statutory law.
- ii -

The Defendants'

unlawful conduct deprived the Plaintiff of his certificate
to teach and damaged the liberty and privacy interests of
the Plaintiff's good name, reputation and professional
image sufficiently to impose a stigma and disability
depriving him of employment opportunities in this and
every state in the United States. Once constitutional
violations are properly alleged and established, this
court is required and empowered to design legal and
equitable remedies effective to cure the constitutional
violations.
The Plaintiff through counsel petitioned the court
for judicial review asserting four causes of action in his
Amended Complaint.

The First Cause of Action restated the

original Complaint's prayer for declaratory and injunctive
relief restoring the Plaintiff's Certificate, and for
prospective ancillary relief of attorney's fees incurred,
court costs, costs of appeal and other ancillary relief
deemed proper by the court.

The Defendant USBE and its

members were properly sued in their entity and official
capacity for prospective injunctive relief and attorneys
fees.
In respect to the Second through Fourth Causes of
Action, Plaintiff alleged general, special, compensatory
and punitive damages against the Defendants in their
individual capacities.

The individual Defendants were
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properly sued in their individual capacities for acts
taken in their official capacities.
The Plaintiff maintains the applicable statute of
limitations does not apply in this action due to relation
back to the original complaint where the original
defendants are sued in a different capacity to properly
satisfy the existing judgment.
The Plaintiff also maintains that he has suffered a
distinct and palpable injury creating a personal stake in
the outcome of this dispute, and has viable claims for
damages and attorneys fees already incurred.
The Plaintiff maintains that the defense of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act is inapplicable to claims of
violations of federal law under 42 U.S.C Section 1983.
Neither the Utah Governmental Immunity Act nor qualified
immunity apply here as the deprivations caused by the
Defendants occurred while acting in their ministerial
capacities and while performing ministerial duties which
were constitutionally owed to the Plaintiff.

Even so, the

Defendants have violated clearly established legal rights
of the Plaintiff which disallows a qualified immunity
defense.
Defendants have not cited authority or facts on which
this court can condone or countenance their constitutional
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violations and unlawful conduct in breaching constitutional
duties owed to the Plaintiff.
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS1 MOTION
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE.
A.
INTRODUCTION
In Ambus v. State Board of Education, supra, this
Court reversed the District Court and granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff's
Third Cause of Action in his original complaint which
complained about the Defendant's use of sealed and
expunged records in the post-revocation hearing•

The

Court remanded to permit the Defendants the opportunity of
introducing any other evidence it had on the alleged
misconduct of the Plaintiff if any existed.
On remand following the decision in Ambus, supra, the
District Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of Action when the
Defendants offered no further evidence of alleged
misconduct by the Plaintiff.

The District Court ordered

the restoration of the Plaintiff's certificate, ordered
the Defendants to notify each school district that the
certificate had been restored, ordered that the Defendants
provide satisfactory proof of compliance, and permitted
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the Plaintiff to amend his complaint to more particularly
set forth his elements of damages which occurred as a
result of the wrongful revocation of the Plaintiff's
Certificate to teach.
The Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on December
26, 1990. The Amended Complaint restated the causes of
action alleged in his original Complaint; however it

set

forth the parties, the capacity of the parties being sued,
and the damages with greater particularity.

The District

Court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
denied him any relief in the form of damages, attorneys
fees, or court costs and forms the basis of this appeal.
The Amended Complaint describes the parties to the
suit and the capacities in which they are sued.

Paragraph

3 alleges that the Utah State Board of Education is sued
as a "state entity" for prospective injunctive relief,
attorneys fees, and court costs. Paragraphs 4 through 7
alleges that the individual members of the Defendant USBE
and others, are sued in their official capacities as well
as their individual capacities. No damages are sought
against the individual defendants in their official
capacities.
The Amended Complaint, like the original complaint,
seeks prospective injunctive relief restoring Plaintiff's
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certificate plus ancillary attorneys fees and costs
against the Utah State Board of Education as a state
entity and the individual members in their official
capacities.

The Amended Complaint, like the original

complaint, seeks general, special, and punitive damages
against the individual defendants in their individual
capacities for the Plaintiff's loss of employment, medical
expenses, mental and emotional distress, and related
damages.
The graveman of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is
the wrongful revocation of his certificate to teach
resulting in the damages alleged.
asserts four causes of action.

The Amended Complaint

The first cause of action

requests judicial review and injunctive relief, attorneys
fees, and costs restoring the Plaintiff's certificate to
teach.

The second cause of action alleges that the

Defendants failed to provide appropriate due process by
failing to provide any pre-deprivation hearing prior to
the revocation of the Plaintiff's certificate, by failing
to restore the Plaintiff's certificate before the
Defendant conducted their "reconsideration hearing", and
by failing to provide any findings or conclusions, all of
which

resulted in the loss of Plaintiff's employment,

corresponding special and general damages, along with
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attorneys fees and costs. The third cause of action
alleges that the use of sealed and expunged records during
the post-deprivation hearing violated the Plaintiff's
constitutional and statutory

rights, which was determined

by this Court in Ambus, supra, and sought corresponding
attorneys fees and costs. The fourth cause of action
seeking damages alleges that the post-deprivation hearing
violated no due process by the use of the sealed and expunged
records, by failing to restore the Plaintiff's Certificate
before the "reconsideration hearing", and by failing to
have any findings of fact or conclusions of law resulting
in a deprivation of the Plaintiff's liberty and property
rights.
B.
THE DEFENDANT UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES ARE
PERSONS UNDER TITLE 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983 AND MAY BE SUED
IN STATE COURT FOR PROSPECTIVE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF,
ANCILLARY ATTORNEYS FEES, AND COURT COSTS.
The District Court restored the Plaintiff's
Certificate to teach.

As such, the Plaintiff was a

successful party under Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 for
purposes of attorneys fees and court costs. Nevertheless,
the District Court dismissed the Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint without even considering them.
Clearly, the District Court erred.

While state

agencies and officers in the official capacities are not
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"persons" for purposes of assessing damages against them,
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109
S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), they certainly are for
purposes of prospective injunctive relief and
corresponding attorneys fees.

As Will explained, 105

L.Ed.2d at 58, n. 10:
"Of course a state official in his or her
official capacity, when sued for injunctive
relief, would be a person under Section 1983
because 'official-capacity1 actions for
prospective relief are not treated as actions
against the State."
The Will Court cited Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 87
L.Ed.2d 114, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985) for this proposition.
Attorneys fees and court costs are proper awards
under Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 as ancillary to the
relief of prospective injunctive relief.

Hutto v. Finney,

437 U.S. 678 (1978).
Accordingly, the District Court erred in not
considering the Plaintiff's request for attorneys fees and
costs by dismissing his Amended Complaint.
C.
THE PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO SUE FOR INJUNCTIVE AND
DECLARATORY RELIEF BECAUSE A CASE OR CONTROVERSY STILL
EXISTS.
The Defendants asserted at the trial court level that
no case or controversy existed after the Plaintiff's
teaching certificate had been restored to him.
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Accordingly, they argued that the Plaintiff's complaint
had to be dismissed.
In response, the Plaintiff asserted that a case and
controversy existed under the Plaintiff's claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief because no attorneys
fees or court costs had been awarded which were ancillary
to the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and
because the Defendants offered no proof of compliance with
the Court's Order that each state, which was notified of
the Plaintiff's revocation to teach, was subsequently
7
notified of the reinstatement.
No question exists that attorneys fees and court
costs are core elements in civil rights cases seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief.

Hutto v. Finney,

supra; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); and
Missouri v. Jenkins by Ageyi, 109 S.Ct. 2463 (1989).
Indeed, Congress enacted Section 1988 of the Civil Rights
Act to insure that successful litigants receive a
reasonable attorneys fee because they fulfill a role of
private attorney generals.
The Plaintiff restated his cause of action for
As of this date, the Plaintiff remains unsuccessful in
finding a school district in Utah or elsewhere which will
hire him. He has been effectively "black-balled".
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injunctive relief in his Amended Complaint because he had
not been awarded his attorneys fees and court costs and
because no satisfactory proof of compliance with the
Court's Order had been provided•

Likewise, the Plaintiff

has suffered a "distinct and palpable injury" and the
Plaintiff's viable claims for damages has created a
personal stake in the outcome of this dispute,
accordingly, a case and controversy still exists. Provo
City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456-457 (Utah 1989).
D.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
i.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS
TIMELY FILED.
In the instant case, the Plaintiff learned of the
suspension and revocation of his certificate on August 24,
1988.

However, he was required to exhaust his

administrative remedies which consisted of the
"reconsideration hearings" which ended on March 21, 1989
when the Defendant Moss denied a stay.

The Plaintiff

filed this action on March 20, 1989. Therefore, the
federal claims in the instant action were more than timely
filed initially.
The Plaintifffs Amended Complaint was also timely
filed.

As stated above, he was required to exhaust his
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administrative remedies.

The Plaintiff learned of the

decision denying reconsideration on March 16, 1989.
Consequently, the statute of limitations period never
commenced until the completion of the "reconsideration"
decisions were completed and the Plaintiff was notifed of
the decision, or March 16, 1989. The amended complaint
was filed well within the statute's period which the
Defendants claim as their defense.

It was filed on

December 26, 1990.
ii.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS RELATION BACK IS PROPER AS
TO THE ORIGINAL DEFENDANTS.
After the successful interlocutory appeal to this
court in Ambus, supra, the trial court allowed the
Plaintiff thirty (30) days to file an amended complaint.
(Index at p. 356-359).

The Plaintiff filed his amended

complaint December 26, 1990.

(Index at p. 370-401).

The

complaint names the Utah State Board of Education and all
of the the original Defendants in their official and
individual capacities who were involved in violating the
constitutional and statutory rights of the Plaintiff.
(Index at p. 370-373).
The Defendants claim that the applicable statute of
limitations is Section 78-12-28(3) U.C.A. (1953), as
amended (1987).

The Defendants claim that the Plaintiff's
- 21 -

Certificate was revoked on August 24, 1988, and because
the Amended Complaint was filed on December 26, 1990, it
is barred by Section 78-12-28(3).
As previously mentioned the Plaintiff initiated this
action March 20, 1989, for violations of his
constitutional and statutory rights without notice,
hearing, findings or due process of law and reguested
damages and attorneys fees, well within the limitations
period the Defendants1 claim as a defense.
Even assuming the Defendants1 argument that this
limitations period applies, under both U.R.C.P. 15(a-c)
and its federal counterpart F.R.C.P. 15(a-c), relation
back to the original pleading is allowed here because (1)
Defendant Superintendent Moss was served with the original
complaint within the limitations period putting all of the
Defendants on notice in their official capacities; (2) the
State Attorney General's Office has represented all of the
Defendants from the outset; (3) there is no change in the
parties before the court, all parties have been on notice
of the facts out of which the claims arose; (4) relation
back is allowed as the Plaintiff only seeks to change the
capacity in which the Defendants are sued to properly
satisfy the judgment, (5) the Defendants have claimed no
cognizable prejudice in their motion to dismiss, and,
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indeed, cannot since the Defendants had notice that the
Plaintiff was attempting to assert claims against them,
(6) no prejudice exists in fact because a change in the
Defendants capacities only means that the parties
themselves have been identified correctly and have
received notice; (7) the delay in amending the complaint
was caused by the Plaintiff's interlocutory appeal in
Ambus, supra; (8) an amendment is proper even if a statute
of limitations has run during the intervening time.
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 768 P.2d 1350
(Ut.App. 1990); Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879
(Utah 1981); Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906
(Utah 1976).
The rule in the State of Utah, under U.R.C.P. 15(a),
and its federal counterpart, provides liberally for
amendment of pleadings.

Especially before trial, leave to

amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires",
and the adverse party is given a fair opportunity to meet
it.

Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1971); Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962).

U.R.C.P. 15(c) states:

"[WJhenever the claim or defense asserted in
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence, set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the
date of the original pleading." Ringwood v.
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., supra, at 1359.
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These rules were adopted to pursue the broad policy which
favors resolution of disputes on the merits rather than
legal technicalities, and relation back is allowed under
the rules even if a statute of limitations has run during
the intervening time. Meyers v. Interwest Corp., supra at
882.
In the instant case, this is particularly valid
where, the real parties have an identity of interest, were
alerted to the proceedings from their inception, and the
Defendants have exploited the running of the statute of
limitations,

and now raise the defense in a motion to

dismiss, because they know that they are the proper
parties.

Courts have even allowed Plaintiffs to claim an

estoppel where an initial pleading error has been
exploited until the running of the statute of limitations.
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, supra, at 906.
Amending the Plaintiff's complaint to include the
Defendants in their individual capacities is proper as the
constitutional deprivation caused by the Defendants are
the same unconstitutional acts set forth in the original
complaint.

The Plaintiff's amended complaint makes no

change in the parties before the court.
Consequently, the identity of interest and
constructive notice have been satisfied through the
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Defendants and their agents, and through its attorneys,
who have had actual knowledge from the inception of this
action within the limitations period, and relation back is
proper, as no new conduct, transaction, or occurrence is
alleged.

Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, supra at 906; Kirk v.

Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 407-408 (5th Cir. 1980);
Metropolitan Paving Co. v. International U. of OP. Eng.,
439 F.2d 300, 306 (10th Cir. 1971); Morrison v. Lefevre,
592 F.Supp. 1052, 1057-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Florence v.
Krasucki, 533 F.Supp. 1047, 1054 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Seber v.
Daniels Transfer Co., 619 F.Supp. 1311, 1314 (W.D.Pa.
1985); Taliferro v. Costello, 467 F.Supp. 33, 35-36
(Ed.Pa. 1979).
Likewise, the instant Defendants

have been on notice

of the facts out of which the claims arose. The
Plaintiff's amendment to include damages does not import
any new or different causes of action, or a change in the
legal theory of the case under the instant facts, and
results in no prejudice to the Defendants.

Behrens v.

Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983);
Roper v. Spring Lake Development Co., 789 P.2d 483 485
(Colo.App. 1990).
The Plaintiff's amended complaint has done no more
than change the manner in which to properly satisfy the

- 25 -

judgment against the Defendants.

This has been held

proper in the case of change in capacity of both
Defendants' and Plaintiff's, and upholds the philosophy
underlying the purpose of both U.R.C.P. 15(a-c) and
F.R.C.P. 15(a-c), rejecting the approach that pleading is
a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be
decisive to the outcome and upholds the principle that
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits;
and relation back is proper when only a change in the
capacity of the instant Defendants is sought.

Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957); Myers v. Interwest
Corp. supra, at 882; 3 Moore's Federal Practice Section
15.15[4.-1] at 15-157:

"Where plaintiff sought to change

the capacity in which the action is brought, or in which
defendant is sued, there is no change in the parties
before the court, all parties are on notice of the facts
out of which the claim arose and relation back was allowed
in both the case of the plaintiff and the defendant.";
Metropolitan Paving Co. v. International U. of Op. Eng.,
supra, at 306; Kirk v. Cronvich, supra; Oppenheimer Mendez
v. Acevedo, 512 F.2d 1373 (1st Cir. 1975); Cook v.
Holland, 575 S.W.2d 468, 477 (K.Y.App. 1978); Longbottom
v. Swaby, 397 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1968).
In the interest of justice and in accord with the
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interlocutory appeal in Ambus, supra, it was an abuse of
the trial courtfs discretion to reject the amended
complaint, as it has prejudiced the Plaintiff's remedy at
law.

Neither the Eleventh Amendment nor State Sovereign

immunity can bar suits for money damages brought against
State officials in their individual capacities when they
are alleged to have violated federal law.
U.S.

Hafer v. Melo,

, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991);

Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283, 100 S.Ct. 553,
558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481, 488 (1980); Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 115 (1985); Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)
iii.
THE CURRENT APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS BEEN
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY RESTRICTED.
The well plead facts of the Plaintiff's amended
complaint shows he timely filed his federal claims. Yet
the Defendants claim the Plaintiff's federal claims are
barred by the two year Statute of Limitations found in
Section 78-12-28(3) U.C.A. (1953), as amended (1987).
This court has already questioned the validity of the
shortend limitations period contained in the statute.
Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., 740 P.2d 1337, 1339
n. 1 (Utah 1987).
The Plaintiff submits that the Utah legislature's
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restriction of Section 78-12-28(3), and attempt to replace
Section 78-12-25(2), now codified as 78-12-25(3) U.C.A.
(1953), as amended, (1987),

has unconstitutionally

restricted his civil rights claim, and discriminates
against federal civil rights remedies. A proper
limitations period is four years, the limitations period
for personal injury actions.
Utah's statute ignores the admonitions of the United
States Supreme Court, and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which hold that because 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claims are
best characterized as personal injury actions, i.e.,
injury to the rights of another, that a State's personal
injury statute of limitations should be applied to all
Section 1983 claims. Owens v. Okure, 109 S.Ct 573, 577
(1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280, 105 S.Ct.
1938, 1949, 85 L.Ed.2d (1985); Mismash v. Murray City, 730
F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984) (in banc).
In Wilson v. Garcia, supra at 265, 105 S.Ct. at 1941,
the United States Supreme Court approved and upheld the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals characterization of Section
1983 claims as remedies for personal injury actions.
Wilson

In

supra, 105 S.Ct. at 1947, the court determined

that, in considering whether all Section 1983 claims
should be characterized in the same way for limitations
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purposes, it was necessary to look to the remedy which
Section 1983 provides.

The court characterized the rights

enforceable under Section 1983 in the following manner:
"Finally we are satisfied that Congress would
not have characterized Section 1983 as
providing a cause of action analagous to state
remedies for wrongs committed by public
officials. It was the very ineffectiveness of
state remedies that led Congress to enact the
Civil Rights Acts in the first place.
Congress therefore intended that the remedy
provided in Section 1983 be independently
enforceable whether or not it duplicates a
parallel state remedy. Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 173, 81 S.Ct. 473, 476 (1961)
In
veiw of our holding that Section 1983 claims
are best characterized as personal injury
actions, (emphasis supplied) the Court of
appeals correctly applies the 3-year [personal
injury statute] statute of limitations.
The court thus decided that one "simple broad
characterization" of all Section 1983 actions was
appropriate under Section 1988, as it best fit the
statute's remedial purpose.

Id. at 272, 105 S.Ct. 1945.

In Owens v. Okure, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 582, and 582
n. 12, the United States Supreme Court again upheld the
principles enunciated in Wilson v. Garcia, supra, and held
that

courts considering Section 1983 claims should borrow

the general or residual statute for personal injury
actions.

The court recognized that Wilson had rejected

recourse to other claimed limitations provisions in the
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first instance, and held that:
"Courts should resort to residual statutes of
limitation only where state law provides
multiple statutes of limitations for personal
injury actions and the residual one embraces,
either explictly or by judicial construction,
unspecified personal injury action."
Such was the case in Utah when Mismash v. Murray
City, 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984) (in banc) was
decided.

At that time, Utah had a general personal injury

"residual provision" which applied to all actions for
relief not otherwise provided for by law.

Id. at 1367.

After Mishmash, the Utah legislature amended Section
78-12-28(3).

In doing so, the Utah legislature ignored

the federal court decisions concerning the use of the
proper statutes of limitations for personal injury
actions.

The Utah legislature also ignored the United

States Supreme Court admonition to apply the residual
statute.
The Plaintiff urges this court to adopt the proper
characterization of a Section 1983 civil rights claim as a
matter of federal law.

The federal values at issue in

selecting a limitations period for Section 1983 claims in
Utah's state courts require this court to follow the
federal remedial nature of compensation and deterrence
under Section 1983, and adopt a state rule which follows
this courts judicial construction of personal injury
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actions. This court's rule for the State of Utah will
allow the Utah courts to follow the admonition of the
United States Supreme Court in Wilson, and Owens supra:
fl

[t]hat the borrowed period of limitations not
discriminate against the federal civil rights
remedy"); Wilson supra at 471 U.S. 276, 105
S.Ct. 1947; fl([F]ederal interests in
uniformity, certainty, and the conclusion that
Congress favored this simple approach; see
also Id., at 272, 105 S.Ct. at 1945 "[A]
simple, broad characterization of all Section
1983 claims best fits the statute's remedial
purpose"). Owens v. Okure, supra, 109 S.Ct.
at 576; ([t]he state rule is adopted as "a
federal rule responsive to the need whenever a
federal right is impaired.") ([C]ongress
surely did not intend to assign to state
courts and legislatures a conclusive role in
the formative function of defining and
characterizing the essential elements of a
federal cause of action.") Wilson, supra at
270, 1943.
The Plaintiff urges this court to adopt the Wilson
standard of a "broad characterization" of Section 1983
actions in Utah's state courts and to take into account
practicalities that are involved in litigating federal
civil rights claims, and to follow this court's own
decisions concerning personal injury actions, and lu ddopt
the four (4) year statute of limitations
78-12-25(3) (1953), as amended,
1983 actions.

found in Section

as applicable in Section

Owens v. Okure, supra at 578 citing Felder

v. Casey, 487 U.S.

, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123

(1988); Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm., 17 P.2d 239,
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240 (Utah 1932).
E.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIMS UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983, 1988 ARE BARRED BY
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND THE LAW OF THE
CASE.
The Plaintiff submits that the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, cannot control the Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 claims.

The "Act" may not provide immunity

for ministerial violations of constitutional rights.

As

the United States Supreme Court held that:
"Conduct by persons acting under color of
state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 or Section 1985(3) cannot be
immunized by state law. A construction of the
federal statute which permitted a state
immunity defense to have controlling effect
would transmute a basic guarantee into an
illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of
the Constitution insured that the proper
construction may be enforced...The immunity
claim raises a question of federal law."
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-284
n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 553, 558 n. 8, 62 L.Ed.2d 481,
488 n. 8, (1980) citing Hampton v. Chicago,
484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973), cert
denied, 415 U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 1413, 39
L.Ed.2d 471.
This court has recognized that Utah's Governmental
Immunity Act may not bar a valid Section 1983 claim.
Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra.
Likewise, the Plaintiff's federal claims may not be
barred by failure to meet notice of claim reguirements.
The notice of claim statutes are pre-empted by federal
- 32

law.

Felder v. Casey supra;

Edwards v. Hare, bH2 F.Supp.

1528, 1535 (D.Utah 1988).
The Plaintiff re-emphasizes that the Defendants in
their individual official capacities are "persons"
reachable under Section 1983 when sued for prospective,
injunctive, equitable relief for conduct violative of
federal law.

As the United States Supreme Court explained

in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. at 71
n. 10 109 S.Ct. at 2311 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. at 2311 n. 10,
105 L.Ed.2d at 58 n. 10:
"Of course a state official in his or her
official capacity, when sued for injunctive
relief, would be a person under Section 1983
because "official-capacity actions for
prospective relief are not treated as actions
against the State." citing Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct.
3099, 3106 n. 14 (1985); Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 159-160, 28 S.Ct. 441, 454 (1908)
see Corum v. University of North Carolina, 413
S.E. 2d 276, 284 (N.C. 1992); Gray V.
University of Kansas Medical Center, 715
F.Supp. 1041, 1043 (D.Kansas 1989).
The individual Defendants sued in their official
capacities are likewise reachable for the ancillary relief
of attorneys fees incurred to the prospective equitable
relief of the return of the Plaintiff's Certificate
Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S.Ct. 1651 (1990); Missouri v.
Jenkins By Agyei, 109 S.Ct. 2463 (1989); Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678, 690 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2573, 57 L.Ed.2d 522
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(1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 9b S.Ct.
2222, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983);
Lorenc v. Call, 789 P.2d 46 (Ut. App. 1990).
The damages for the Plaintiff's properly alleged
constitutional violations by the Defendants in their
individual personal capacities for these acts, likewise,
may not be immunized by state law.
U.S.

Hafer v. Melo,

, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991);

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87
L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94
S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

The trial courts

holding that the Plaintifffs federal claims are barred by
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was clear error.
The trial court also adopted the Defendants1
contention that the Plaintiff's claims are barred by the
law-of-the-case doctrine.

The Defendants argued before

the trial court that the court should not reverse itself
on this issue even though the trial court's initial
decision was wrong.

The Plaintiff alleged that the

doctrine of the law of the case did not prevent a judge
from reconsidering his previous nonfinal orders. The
Plaintiff submitted that the Defendants' violation of
clearly established constitutional and statutory law, and
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this court's decision in Ambus v. Utah State Board of
Education, 800 P.2d 811 (Utah 1990), constituted grounds
for the court to reconsider its previous erroneous
applications of the law.
734 (Utah 1990).

Plumb v. State of Utah, 809 P.2d

The trial court's failure to reconsider

its previous erroneous applications of the law was clear
error.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE INDIVIDUAL
DEFENDANTS, SUED IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES UNDER 42
U.S.C. SECTION 1983, ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY.
•
1.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY APPLIES ONLY TO OFFICIALS PERFORMING
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS.
The well plead facts of the Plaintiff's amended
complaint alleges ministerial violations of the
Plaintiff's civil rights under Section 42 U.S.C. Section
1983, 1988, as well as under the United States and Utah
Constitutions for direct enforcement thereof, by State
officials in their personal capacities, acting under color
of law.

Damages are sought from the individuals in their

personal capacities.
The trial court adopted the Defendants' contention
that the "individual" defendants, inasmuch as they are
sued in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983, are entitled to "qualified immunity."
- 35 -

(Index at p.

490-492).

The court's decision did not identify the law

upon which it relied nor did it state the basis for its
conclusion (Ibid.)
It is well established that the instant Defendants
are state governmental officials who may be sued in their
individual capacities for damages for violations of
federal law under Section 1983. Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Scheuer
V. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441 52 L.Ed. 714
(1908).

These holdings were recently affirmed and applied

in Hafer v. Melo,

U.S., 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d

301 (1991).
Admittedly, the instant Defendants may raise a
defense of qualified immunity for discretionary acts.

If

an assertion of qualified immunity is raised, it is
evaluated under the standard enunciated by in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396

(1982).

Normally, qualified immunity is a defense which

must be pleaded in an answer to a complaint, Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 636, 100 S.Ct. 1920 64 L.Ed.2d (1980);
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, at 815, 102 S.Ct. at 2736.
In the instant case the Defendants have not plead the
defense in an answer, but have raised the defense as a
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motion to dismiss.
Under these circumstances the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has identified the appellate standards for
reviewing qualified immunity upon a motion to dismiss.
Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers v. Losavio, 847 F.2d
642 (10th Cir. 1988); Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F.2d
930, 932-934 (10th Cir. 1987).

Under a Motion to Dismiss

the Defendants must be deemed challenging the sufficiency
of the complaint on its face, i.e., the Plaintiff's
pleaded facts fail to show that the Defendants conduct was
ministerial or violated clearly established constitutional
or statutory law of which a reasonable person would have
known.
At the trial court, the Plaintiff responded by
identifying the Defendants1 acts which violated the law by
failing to provide notice, hearings, findings, and
violation of the expungement code, as ministerial
operational acts that were constitutionally, statutorily
and administratively regulated duties owed to the
Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff likewise identified constitutional and
statutory law that Defendants violated which was clearly
established when the alleged violations occurred.
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
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542 (1985); Matter of Noren, 621 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1980);
State v, Jones, 581 P.2d 141 (1978); (Index at p.
452-463).

While the Plaintiff agrees that the principles

enunciated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald

supra, controls these

issues, it does not require entry of judgment in favor of
the Defendants in the instant case.
An evaluation of qualified immunity under Harlow v.
Fitzgerald supra, at 817-818, 102 S.Ct. 2737-2738, sets
forth a presumptive knowledge of and respect for basic
clearly established constitutional rights, and sets forth
an objective standard for determining whether qualified
immunity will act as a bar to further litigation in a suit
by providing that:
"government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."
On the other hand, a Defendant official may be held
personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official
action if he was performing ministerial functions, or if
his discretionary conduct was violative of what has been
come to be known as the Harlow "objective legal
reasonableness test." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 107 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d (1987).
In Anderson supra, at 639, 107 S.Ct. at 3039, the
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Supreme Court attempted to explain what the court meant by
"clearly established" as used in Harlow supra.

In order

to make "clearly established law" meaningful with regard
to the "objective legal reasonableness test", the court
set forth the more particularized inquiry:
"The contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing
violated that right. That is not to say that
an official action is protected by qualified
immunity unless the very action in question
has previously been held unlawful, but it is
to say that in light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent."
This approach has been recongized by the Tenth Circuit,
in Garcia By Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir.
1987); and Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir.
1991).

This approach does not expect officials to

anticipate the evolution of law, but does not give the
officials "liability-free violations of constitutional or
statutory requirements."

Insisting on a precise factual

correspondence between the conduct at issue and reported
case law is tantamount to such a license.

People of Three

Mile Island v. Nuclear Reg. Com'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 145 (3rd
Cir. 1984).
Courts interpreting Harlow supra, have determined
that Harlow, has created a two-part analysis to determine
if qualified immunity should apply to defendants in any
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given case.

Courson v. McMillian/ 939 F.2d 1479, 1487

(11th Cir. 1991).

The Defendant public official must

first factually prove that he was acting within the scope
of his "discretionary authority" when the alleged wrongful
acts occurred, and if so proven, the Plaintiff must come
forward with the burden of proof demonstrating that the
Defendant public officials1 actions violated clearly
established statutory or constitutional or law.
This court need not decide the "clearly established"
issue in this case because qualified immunity is
recognized only as a threshold matter under Harlow supra,
where the defendant officials are performing
"discretionary functions."

Harlow supra, 457 U.S. 818,

102 S.Ct. at 2738; Wolfenbarger v. Williams, supra at 932;
Utah State Univ., Etc. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah
1982); Dobos v. Driscoll, 537 NE.2d 558 (Mass. 1989);
Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Commfrs, 513 N.E.2d
1277 (Mass. 1987) (where acts are ministerial, no valid
claim of qualified immunity can be raised).
Courts are familiar with the discretionaryministerial distinction.

Discretionary decisions occur on

a broad, policy-making level and ministerial decisions
take

place at the implementing, ministerial, or

operational level. Little v. Utah Div. of Family
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Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983); Frank v. State of
Utah, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).
In the instant case, assuming that the decision of
the Defendants to bring charges against the Plaintiff to
suspend or revoke his certificate were "discretionary",
once that decision was made, the ministerial, operational,
or implementing hearing process was initiated and the
defendants accepted specific constitutional and statutory
duties owed to the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff has alleged

facts, and the admissions already made by the Defendants
in this case shows, that the constitutional, statutory,
and regulatory duties of notice, hearings, findings, and
violations of the expungement code, bearing upon the
claims of the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff, were
constitutional duties that were breached by the Defendants
that were owed the Plaintiff.

Wolfenbarger supra at 935;

Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services supra 51;
Berkovitz By Berkovitz v. U.S., 108 S.Ct. 1954, 1959
(1988); Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S.Ct. 580
(1988)(recognizing that conduct cannot be discretionary if
prescribed by law); Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735,
737-739 (10th Cir. 1977).

Consequently, the qualified

immunity defense of the Defendants must fail.
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ii.
THE DEFENDANTS VIOLATED CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW.
Even assuming the Defendants1 conduct was
"discretionary", the constitutional violations alleged in
the instant case are the intentional deprivations of the
Plaintiff's certificate, property, liberty, and privacy
interests without due process of law.

The Defendants do

not dispute that the Plaintiff's certificate constitutes
an entitlement to a property and liberty interest, or that
their violations of due process or the expungement code
deprived the Plaintiff of these interests. Nor do they
dispute that a deprivation occurred.
The questions then for the court are whether, in
light of clearly established statutory and constitutional
law and the facts of this case, whether reasonable
officials should have known that it was not lawful for
them to (1) violate due process and suspend and revoke the
Plaintiff's certificate without prior notice and an
opportunity for the Plaintiff to respond, without any
findings of fact or conclusions of law, and then to
notify every state in the United States of the revocation;
(2) refuse to return the Plaintiff's certificate prior to
its reconsideration hearings; (3) use sealed and expunged
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records in violation of Utah's Expungement Act, at the
reconsideration hearings in order to support the
Defendants1 original suspension and revocation of the
Plaintiff's certificate; and (4) then without any
findings or conclusions uphold its original revocation
resulting in the deprivation of the Plaintiff's property
and

privacy interests which are secured by the United

States Constitution as well as the expungement code.
In 1988, when the Defendants' actions breached their
duties owed to the Plaintiff, the law was clearly
established that the Plaintiff was, by constitutional,
statutory, and administrative prescription, entitled to
notice, and opportunity to respond prior to suspension and
revocation of a protected property, and liberty interest.
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699 (1972);

Bailey v. Kirk, 777 F.2d 567, 575 (10th Cir. 1985); Miller
v. City of Mission, Kan., 705 F.2 368, 373 (10th Cir.
1983); Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liguor Control Comm'n,
657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1983).
It was clearly established in March of 1988 through
March of 1989 that the

Defendants should have returned
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the Plaintiff's certificate, prior to its reconsideration
hearings, as the Plaintiff was entitled due process in
the first instance. At a minimum, the subsequent
"reconsideration hearings" were constitutionally
inadequate due to the failure of the Defendants to return
the Plaintiff's certificate.

Cleveland Board of Ed. v.

Loudermill supra, at 547 n. 12, 84 L.Ed.2d

at 507 n.

12; Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987); Ward v.
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80 (1972).
It was clearly established in March of 1988 through
March of 1989 that the Plaintiff was entitled to
protection from arbitrary deprivations of his property,
liberty and privacy interests protected by statutory
entitlement.

Whalen v. Roe, 429, U.S. 589, 599 n. 23, 97

S.Ct. 876 n. 23, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977); Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507 (1971);
Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F.2d 930, 933-934 (10th Cir.
1987); Miller v. City of Missions supra, at 373; Celebrity
Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n

supra.

It was clearly established in March of 1988 through
March of 1989 that the Plaintiff possessed a protectable
legitimate expectation under the constitution that
information found in a sealed and expunged file would
remain confidential while in the State's possession. Nixon
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v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425,
457-58, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2797-90, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1977).
Additionally, it was clearly established that the
Plaintiff had a statutory expectation that the expunged
evidence would not be used by the Defendants to summarily
suspend and revoke the Plaintiff's certificate. Likewise,
it was clearly established under decisional law in Utah.
In State v. Jones, 581 P.2d 141 (Utah 1978), expunged
records were found inadmissible as evidence in cases like
the one before this court.

Further this court's holding

in Matter of Noren, 621 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1981), forbade the
use of expunged records as evidence of moral turpitude in
state governmental license revocation proceedings. Also,
Doe v. Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 782 P.2d 489 (1989)
was pending before this Court and the trial court had
already decided that the State could not use sealed and
expunged records in a licensing matter.

The clear

language of Utah's Expungement Statute and these cases
should have made it sufficiently clear that the instant
defendants should have understood what they were doing
violated the Plaintiff's rights secured thereunder.

In

light of this "pre-existing law", the instant Defendants'
unlawfulness is apparent.

The Defendants attempted to

carve out an exception for itself that was not provided
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for in the statute nor supported by prior case law.
Ambus v. Utah State Board of Ed. supra.
The Defendants1 ministerial acts of depriving the
Plaintiff of his entitlement to his property, liberty and
privacy interests created and secured by state law, have
damaged the Plaintiff's good name, reputation and
professional image sufficiently to impose a "badge of
infamy" and disability that has foreclosed the Plaintiff's
freedom to take advantage of employment opportunities in
every state in the United States.
The Plaintiff's constitutional right to engage in his
occupation was deprived by the Defendants' violations of
clearly established constitutional and statutory law.
The Plaintiff's certificate, and privacy interests, were
benefits and entitlements secured by state law, and
likewise, his liberty and privacy interests
constitutionally protected.

Under these circumstances the

Defendants should not be entitled to gualified immunity
and the lower court's ruling is clear error.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES
PROPERTY AND LIBERTY
AND

ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON THE
OF ACTION ALLEGING DEPRIVATIONS OF
INTERESTS DIRECTLY UNDER THE FEDERAL
STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

The Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges specific
deprivations of property and liberty interests directly
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under the United States and Utah Constitutions.

In

Paragraph 16, the Plaintiff alleges that his certificate
is property and his name and reputation are liberty
interests within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as
under Article 1 Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and
related provisions.

Paragraphs 19, 37, 44, and 48 asserts

that the deprivation of the Plaintifffs property and
liberty interests violates these same provisions of the
United States and Utah Constitutions.

The District Court

failed to rule on these allegations.
The Plaintiff contends that he has stated viable
causes of action against the Defendants directly under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution as well as directly under Article 1 Section 7
of the Utah Constitution.

These constitutional provisions

were created specifically to protect property and liberty
interests of citizens which were safeguarded by the
respective Constitutions.

Clearly, an implied cause of

action under the stated Federal Constitutional provisions
is proper.

Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics

Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228 (1979); and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized:
"Where legal rights have been invaded,
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and a federal statute provides for a general
right to sue for such invasion, federal courts
may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done....Our government has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, not
of men. It will certainly cease to deserve
this high appellation if the laws furnish no
remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right." Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools and William Prescott, 112 S.Ct. 1028,
1033 (1992) (quoting Bell v. Hood supra and
Marbury v. Madison, 1 CRANCH 137, 163 (1803).
Consistent with the federal notice of an implied
cause of action directly under the federal constitution,
state courts have also found an implied cause of action
directly under state constitutions.

In a case having

defenses asserted similar to the instant controversy, the
North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the government's
defenses and found that an individual may redress an
unlawful deprivation of liberty or property interests by
an implied cause of action directly under the North
Carolina's Constitution.

Corum v. University of North

Carolina, 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992).

Also see: Bagg v.

University of Tex. Medical Branch, 726 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.Ct.
App. 1987); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Center, 479
A.2d 921, 927-929 (Md. 1984) (citing numerous state courts
redressing a state or federal constitutional deprivation
by an implied damage action); Fenton v. Groveland
Community Serv. Dist., 135 Cal.App. 3d 797 (Cal.App.
1982); Gay Law Student Association v. Pacific Telephone
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Co,, 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979); Porten v. University of San
Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 825 (Cal. App. 1976)(damages
awarded for improper disclosure of academic records).
While this court has yet to address the issue, this
Court has recognized that the people of Utah established
the Utah Constitution as a limitation on the power of the
government, and that the Utah Constitution, Article 1,
Section 22, is self-executing and needs no legislation to
activate it.

Coleman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d

622, 634-635 (Utah 1990).

Similarly, the due process

clauses of both the United States and Utah Constitutions
need no legislation to activate them and a damage remedy
to redress violations should be implied as a matter of
law.

RELIEF SOUGHT
The Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the District Court's Order dismissing the
Plaintiff's Complaint and remanding for the purpose of
addressing the damage claims of the Plaintiff.

The

Plaintiff also requests this Court to award attorneys
fees and for the successful prosecution of this appeal.
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ORAL ARGUMENT
The Plaintiff requests oral argument in this matter.
DATED this

V

day of July, 1992.

<3t.rA /1JL
STEPHEN W. COOK
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GREGORY T. AMBUS,
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UTAH STATE BOARD OF
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CHRISTENSEN, MARGARET R.
NELSON, VALERIE J. KENSON,
and JOHN MILLECAM, individually
and as members of the UTAH
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION;
GAIL L. MLADEJOVSKY, MARILYN
WENZEL, JEANINE T. BOSCH,
JOHN L. JAUSSI, and PAUL J.
RASBAND, individually and as
members of the Professional
Practices Advisory Commission;
and ROGER C. MOURITSEN,
individually and as Executive
Secretary of the UTAH STATE
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendants.

SECOND AMENDED
VERIFIED PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND COMPLAINT

Civil No. 890901757AA
Judge James S. Sawaya

The Plaintiff, Gregory T. Ambus, by and through his
counsel, Stephen W. Cook, hereby petitions for judicial
review as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Judicial Review)
1.

Jurisdiction is vested in this Court under and

by virtue of the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction
pursuant to Title 42, United States Codes, Sections 1983,
1985, and 1988 and Title 28, United States Code, Sections
1331 and 1343; also pursuant to the United States and Utah
Constitutions for direct enforcement thereof; also
pursuant to Section 63-46(b)-15 U.C.A. (1953), as amended;
and also pursuant to Section 78-3-4 U.C.A. (1953), as
amended.
2.

The Petitioner is Gregory T. Ambus whose mailing

address is 3316 El Serrito Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah
84109.
3.

The Defendant Utah State Board of Education is a

respondent agency

and its mailing address is 250 East 500

South, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111.

It is sued in the

capacity as a "state entity" for purposes of Title 42,
U.S.C., Sections 1983, 1985 and 1988 and prospective
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injunctive relief, attorneys fees, and court costs.
4.

The Estate of Defendant James R. Moss is sued

for his individual acts and for his acts in an official
capacity as Superintendent of the Utah State Board of
Education.
5.

The Defendants Jay B. Taggert, Neola Brown,

Keith T. Checketts, John M. R. Covey, Ruth Hardy Funk,
Darlene Hutchison, Frances Hatch Merrill, M. Richard
Maxfield, Donald G. Christensen, Margaret R. Nelson,
Valerie J, Kenson, and John Millecam, are sued
individually and in their official capacities as members
of the Utah State Board of Education.
6.

The Defendants Gail L. Mladejovsky, Marilyn

Wenzel, Jeanine T. Bosch, John L. Jaussi, and Paul J.
Rasband are sued individually and in their official
capacities as members of the Utah State Professional
Practices Advisory Commission, an agent of the Utah State
Board of Education.
7.

The Defendant Roger C. Mouritsen is sued

individually and in his official capacity as Executive
Secretary of the Utah State Board of Education.

At all

times herein material, the Defendant Roger C. Mouritsen
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aided, assisted, and encouraged all other individual
Defendants in the deprivation of Petitioner's rights,
privileges, and liberties as hereinafter set forth.
8.

At all times herein material, the

Defendants

were acting under color of law and deprived the Petitioner
of rights, privileges, and liberties protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States and State of
Utah.

In addition, at all times pertinent herein, the

Defendants were performing ministerial acts which created
policies which operated to deprive the Petitioner of such
rights, privileges, and liberties.
9.

The title and date of the final agency action to

be reviewed is the initial revocation of the Petitioner's
teaching certificate on August 19, 1988 and the final
revocation of the Petitioner's teaching certificate on
March 16, 1989. A copy of such initial agency action is
attached as Exhibit A and a copy of final agency action is
attached hereto as Exhibit B.
10.

The persons who were parties to the informal

adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action are
the Petitioner and the Defendants as identified above.
11.

A copy of the written order from the informal

- 4 -

proceeding is attached as Exhibit C.
12.

The Defendant Utah State Board of Education is a

state agency charged by the Utah Constitution, Article X,
Section 8 and by Utah Law, Section 53A-1-401 U.C.A.
(1953), as amended, with the general supervision and
control of the public school system.
13.

As part of the Defendant Utah State Board of

Education's duties of general supervision and control, it
has authority to issue and revoke certificates to teach
under Section 53A-6-101 et. seq. U.C.A. (1953), as
amended.
14.

Under Section 53A-6-104 U.C.A. (1953), as

amended, the Defendant Utah State Board of Education may
revoke or suspend state certificates "for immoral,
unprofessional, or incompetent conduct or evident
unfitness for services authorized by the certificates.
15.

On August 13, 1981, the Defendant Utah State

Board of Education issued to Petitioner a Standard
Secondary Certificate with Biological and Physical Science
endorsements.
16.

Petitioner's Certificate to teach constitutes

property within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth

- 5 -

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I
Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah and related
provisions.

Petitioner's good name and reputation are

liberty interests also protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah and
related provisions*
17.

At all times herein material, the Petitioner's

Certificate was valid until revoked by the Defendant Utah
State Board of Education for cause as described herein.
18.

On March 18, 1988, the Defendant Utah State

Board of Education, through the Defendant Roger C.
Mouritsen, filed a Complaint against the Petitioner for,
"Information was received indicating that Gregory Ambus as
charged with two counts of drug distribution and one count
of drug selling, stemming from alleged marijuana exchanges
with or witnessed by a police informant."
19.

Any revocation of the Petitioner's Certificate

to teach on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint
or on the basis of immorality, unprofessional or
incompetent conduct deprived the Petitioner of his liberty
and property interests under the Fifth and Fourteenth
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Amendments to the United States Constitution and under
Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and related
provisions.
20.

On August 17, 1988, the Petitioner was employed

by the Salt Lake City School District pursuant to a
written contract which is attached hereto as Exhibit D and
is incorporated by reference herein.
21.

On August 19, 19 88, the Defendant Utah State

Board of Education initially revoked the Petitioner's
Certificate by letter dated August 24, 1988 from the
Defendant State Superintendent which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A and is incorporated by reference herein.
22.

On August 24, 1988, the Petitioner requested

reconsideration of the revocation by letter which is
attached hereto as Exhibit E and is incorporated by
reference herein.
23.

On August 24, 1988, the Salt Lake City School

District terminated the Petitioner's contract of
employment with the Salt Lake City School District because
the Petitioner's Certificate had been revoked.
24.

On September 26, 1988, the Defendants scheduled

a hearing to consider reinstatement of the Petitioner's
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Certificate.

See Exhibit F which is attached and

incorporated by reference herein.
25.

On September 27, 1988, Petitioner through his

counsel specifically protested the revocation of
Petitioner's Certificate to teach without due process and
demanded that the Certificate be restored prior to any
further hearings.

See Exhibit G which is attached and

incorporated by reference herein.
26.

On October 20, 1988, an informal hearing was

conducted by the Defendants.

In such hearing, the

Petitioner denied any wrongdoing.

In addition, the

Petitioner objected to the hearing on several bases.

See

Exhibit H which is attached and incorporated by reference
herein.
27.

On March 16, 1989, the Defendants notified the

Petitioner of its final agency action that its initial
revocation of the Petitioner's Certificate was upheld.
The Defendants did not issue any findings of fact or
conclusions of law to justify any revocation as required
by statute or as required by the United States
Constitution or the Constitution of Utah.
28.

The Petitioner is entitled to judicial review by
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trial de novo under Section 63-46(b)-15 U.C.A. (1953), as
amended•
29.

The Defendants unlawfully revoked the

Petitioner's Certificate in violation of Section 53A-6-104
U.C.A- (1953), as amended, and the Petitioner's right to
due process of law in that the Petitioner's alleged
conduct was not immoral, unprofessional, incompetent, or
evident unfit for services authorized by his Certificate.
30.

The Petitioner lacks an adequate remedy at law.

31.

The Petitioner is entitled to a preliminary and

final Order, Judgment, and Decree restoring the
Petitioner's Certificate to teach.
32.

The Petitioner is entitled to a reasonable

attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner prays for relief and
judgment as more particularly set forth herein.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Pre-Deprivation Hearing)
33.

The Petitioner incorporates by reference

paragraphs 1 through 32 of his First Cause of Action as if
specifically set forth herein.
34.

Petitioner's Certificate to teach could not
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revoked without a prior deprivation hearing with full
substantive and procedural due process of law being
afforded.

Such legal rights were clearly established

prior to the events complained of herein.
35.

On May 20, 1988, the Defendant Professional

Practices Advisory Commission through the actions of the
individual Defendant members, recommended to the Defendant
State Board of Education that the Petitioner's teaching
certificate be suspended until such time as the Petitioner
requested a hearing before the Commission.
36.

On August 24, 1988, the Defendant Utah State

Board of Education through the actions of the individual
Defendant members, revoked the Petitioner's Certificate to
teach without prior notice or hearing to the Petitioner.
By law, any such revocation was because the Petitioner
engaged in conduct which was immorale, unprofessional,
incompetent, or unfit.

Nevertheless, the Defendants made

no findings of fact or conclusions of law which justified
any suspension or revocation.
37.

The actions of the Defendants, as described in

the preceding two paragraphs violated the Petitioner's
right to procedural and substantive due process of law as
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provided in the Utah and United States Constitutions, and
the Amendments thereto, as well as the Petitioner's right
to equal protection and due process of law under Section
1983 and 1985, Title 42, United States Code.
38.

As a result of the Defendants acts and

violations as set forth above, the Petitioner was
wrongfully deprived of liberty and property interests.

In

particular, the wrongful revocation of the Petitioner's
Certificate to teach resulted in his loss of employment
from August 24, 1988 to the present and resulted in damage
to the Petitioner's good name and reputation, not only in
the State of Utah but also in each state of the United
States.
39.

The Petitioner is entitled to damages and/or

equitable monetary relief ancillary to injunctive relief
for his loss of employment opportunities from the
defendants in their individual capacities, from August 24,
1988 until the Plaintiff receives a proper pre-deprivation
hearing or until the Plaintiff receives comparable gainful
employment, whichever first occurs.
40.

As a further result of the individual

defendants' wrongful acts, the Petitioner has suffered,
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and continues to suffer loss of professional reputation
and standing, substantial mental and emotional distress
and suffering, including medical expenses, all to his
general damages in the amount of $500,000.00 and special
damages in the amount of $5,000.00.
41.

The individual defendants knew, or should have

known, that the Petitioner was clearly entitled to a
proper pre-deprivation hearing and such rights were
clearly established at such time.

The failure to provide

such a hearing was in callous and malicious disregard of
the Petitioner's constitutional rights, constituted cruel
indifference to his personal well-being, and was
substantially lacking in good faith.

The Petitioner is

therefore entitled to punitive damages in an amount found
to be reasonable by the Court as a wholesome warning to
the defendants and to others similarly situated to avoid
conduct of the nature complained of herein.
42.

The Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable

attorneyfs fee.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner prays for relief and
judgment as hereinafter set forth.
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Use of Expunged Proceedings)
43.

The Plaintiff incorporates by reference

Paragraphs 1-42 of his First and Second Causes of Action
as if specifically set forth herein.
44.

In revoking the Petitioner's Certificate, the

Defendants utilized evidence which was expunged, sealed,
and judicially pardoned by Orders of this Court and by law
all in violation of the due process provisions of the
United States Constitution, its Amendments, as well as the
Constitution of Utah.

In addition, the alleged conduct of

the Petitioner which formed the basis of the revocation
occurred more than one year prior and the use thereof by
the Defendants violated Section 78-12-29(2) U.C.A. (1953),
as amended.
45.

The Petitioner is entitled to an Order restoring

the Petitioner's Certificate to teach.
46.

The Petitioner is entitled to a reasonable

attorney's fee.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner prays for relief and
judgment as more particularly set forth herein.
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Post Deprivation Hearing)
47.

The Petitioner incorporates by reference

Paragraphs 1-46 of his First, Second, and Third Causes of
Action as if specifically set forth herein.
48.

The individual Defendants1 use of expunged,

sealed, and pardoned evidence in suspending, revoking, and
failing to reinstate the Petitioner's Certificate violated
the Petitioner's right to due process and equal protection
of the law in violation of the Utah and United States
Constitution and its Amendments.

In addition, the

individual Defendants' use of such evidence violated the
Petitioner's right to privacy and adversely affected his
liberty interests in maintaining his good name,
professional standing, and position in society.

Lastly,

the individual Defendants failed to provide any findings
of fact or conclusions to support its actions in violation
of the Utah and United States Constitution, and its
Amendments.
49.

As a result of the individual defendant's

wrongful acts, the Plaintiff suffered the loss of his
employment from August 24, 1988 to the present not only in
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the State of Utah but each of the United States. The
Plaintiff is entitled to damages from the individual
defendants for such loss until he becomes re-employed, in
an amount found reasonable by the Court.

In the

alternative, the Petitioner is entitled to damages for
lost income and future earnings.
50.

As a further result of the individual

defendants1 wrongful acts, the Petitioner has suffered,
and continues to suffer loss of professional reputation
and standing, substantial mental and emotional distress
and suffering, including medical expenses, all to his
general damages in the amount of $500,000.00 and special
damages in the amount of $5,000.00.
51.

The individual defendants knew, or should have

known, that the Petitioner was clearly entitled to privacy
and a proper due process hearing, including findings, and
such rights were clearly established at such time. The
failure to respect the Petitioner's privacy and the
failure to provide a due process hearing with findings
were in callous and malicious disregard of the
Petitioner's constitutional rights, constituted cruel
indifference to his personal well-being, and was
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substantially lacking in good faith.

The Petitioner is

therefore entitled to punitive damages in an amount found
to be reasonable by the Court as a wholesome warning to
the defendants and to others similarly situated to avoid
conduct of the nature complained of herein,
52.

The Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable

attorney's fee.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner respectfully petitions for
relief as follows:
1.

For Judicial Review of the Agencyfs actions by

trial de novo pursuant to Section 63-46(b)-15 U.C.A
(1953), as amended;
2.

For a preliminary and permanent injunction

requiring the Respondent to immediately reinstate the
Petitioner's Certificate;
3.

For

a Judgment restoring the Plaintiff's

certificate to teach nunc pro tunc as of the date of
revocation;
4.

For damages to be found by the Court for the

Petitioner's loss of employment opportunities;
5.

For the sum of $500,000.00 in compensatory

damages for the Petitioner's mental and emotional
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distress;
6.

For special damages in the amount of $5,000.00;

7.

For punitive damages in an amount found

reasonable by the Court; and,
8.

For reasonable attorneyfs fees and costs of

court.
DATED this

Q-(q

day of December, 1990.

STEPHEN W. COOK
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's address:
3316 El Serrito Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
COMES NOW GREGORY T. AMBUS, having first been
duly sworn upon oath, and deposes and says that he is the
plaintiff in the above action, that he has read the
foregoing Second Verified Petition for Judicial Review and
Complaint and executed the same, and that he knows the
contents thereof to be true, except to those items stated
on information, and believes those items to be true.
/

U^Aj^yy^-

GREGORY T. AMBUS
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ol\$r\ day
of December, 1990.

IN2<35^

Notary Public

J

becember30,1992

f

KAREN L KNUTSCN *
1815 E Osage Orange Ave l
SaltUkeCffy, Utah 84124 J
M^ComrrrfMten Expires \

NOTARY FO:
R e s t i n g i n S a l t Lake County

lq-3cs~<VZ-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
: ss.
)

KAREN L. KNUTSON, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Cook & Davis,
attorneys for Plaintiff herein; and that she served the
attached SECOND AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND COMPLAINT upon:
Mr- John S. McAllister
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake
City, Utah, on the £(<Mi day of December, 19 90.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this c^/h day of
December, 19 90.
!3£2£<u

W
ssmir
»8Pfe«lfy/9PulSi

My Commission E x p i r e s :

MARK c. mm^
Re^dMMgnvSctf\&§-lM /Sake County
^

Salt
C.ty >^/J
^/J
UTLake
84121

>
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Gregorv Thomas Ambus
649 East 1600 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Dear Mr. Ambus:
The Utah State Board of Education at its regular meeting held on
August 19, 1988, took formal actio* to revoke your Standard Secondary
Certificate with Biological and Pl^sical Science endorsements effective
immediately. This action is basedf on a hearing held and recommendation made
by the Utah Professional Practices Advisory Commission.
Since your certificate reflects validity through June 30, 1991, it is required
that you surrender your certificate to this office immediately. You may mail
or deliver your certificate to us in person.
Sincerely,

James R. Moss
State Superintendent
of Public Instruction
JRM:RCH:m

I

UTAH STATE OFFICE
OF EDUCATION
State Sujx-nnicodcnl of Public Instruction

EXHIBIT

I—
UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
UTAH STATE HOARD FOR VOCATIONAL EDUCATION
Ruth rWrdv Funk/Ov** • Nr<>U Brown/V'KC Chair
KothT. Chtrcketu • Donald G.Chrm*f**n
John M. R.Covry • D*rlci>« C. HutchUon
VMUTOC J.KrUou • V. J«y LJechty • M. Rlchmrxi M**fi«W

RECEIVED AT
C O O K & WILDE
MAR 16 1989
March 1 6 , 1989

Gregory T. Ambus
649 East 1600 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Dear Mr. Ambus:
The State Board of Education has received the findings and
recommendation from the appeal panel appointed 1 o consider your request for
reinstatement of your teaching certificate. Th<: panel recommended that "the
decision of the State Board of Bdkication made on August 18, 1988, be upheld,
i.e., that the revocation of Grejary Ambus1 teaching certificate be upheld."
A copy of the Hearing Officer's letter to me dated January 5, 1989, is
enclosed.
The Utah State Board of Education has directed me to inform you that
they accept the panel recommendation and that the revocation will stand.
Sincerely yours,

James R . -koss
State Superintendent
of Public Instruction
JRM/la/01
enclosure
cc:

Stephen W. Cook (hand delivered 3-16-89)

SJt Lit. Cntr. Uui. 841

Je*n"frve T. Rosch
Chilrwwin
1455 South JUdera H i l l s
5ount1ful, UT 84010
0*n M. Wells
Ylce-Chalrwvin
Cleveland,
UT 84518
0*nUe K. CUnlels
RR)

3 BOJC

212

Spanish Fort, UT 84660
Kyle 0 . 0y«
Rt. 1 Sox 1342
Koosev I t , UT 84066
E. Art Efchbaaer
1457 C i s t Bob U n €
S*ndy, UT 84092
R o s i H e S. e n o l i n d
220 Tule C i r c l e
T o o e l e , UT 84074
Jofw L. JAVSSI
C o t l v U l t , UT 84017
£ a t l I . Mladejovsky
2826 E. Thunderblrd Or.
S a l t L A U C i t y , UT 84109
Pial J . FUsbtnd
485 D u t 520 Worth
A d r i a n F o r t , UT 84003
K i H l y n Wenrel
107S South 9S0 F i s t
S t . £<oroe. UT 84770
Betty YanovUz
3327 E. Chaundra Ave.
S a l t Lake C U y , UT 84124

Superintendent James R. Hoss
Utah State Office of Education
250 East 500 South
Salt Late City, Utah 84111
Dear Superintendent Moss:
On October TO, 1988, a hearing panel was convened t o consider a request of Gregory T. Ambus for reinstatement
of his teacfing c e r t i f i c a t e . The Rules for Adjudicative
Hearings were invoked and Ms. Gail Mladejovsky was
appointed hearing officer by the State Board of Education
to hear the appeal. Members of the hearing panel were
Marilyn Henzel, Jeanine Bosch, John Jaussi, and Paul
Rasband^
Mr. Ambc was represented by counsel at the hearing which
was heMin the Salt Lake City School District Offices.
Subsequent to the hearing, the panel reviewed the evidence
and the following is a motion made on December 16, 1988,
by John Jaussi and seconded by Paul Rasband:
The hearing panel recommends that the
decision of the State Board of Education
made on August 18, 1988, be upheld, i . e . ,
thit the revocation of Gregory Ambus1
teaching c e r t i f i c a t e be upheld.
Sincerely,

Gail L. Mladejovsky
Hean'nj Officer

]

Executive S e c r e t a r y
ftooer C. Houritsen
Utah S t a t e O f f i c e of Education

GLMrrra

EXHIBIT
SALT LAKECTTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

Name

.

Jjnv%

w

-WO East First South
| Salt Lake Gty, Utah 84111

|

Gregory T. Ambus

Date g-17-88

You have been approved for recommendation to the Board of Education for employment to a position in the
Salt Lake City School District as indicated below (Forcontract teachers the first two years are provisional status.
Your employment is conditioned upon the Continuing Written Agreement.)
Position: Teacher
•Salary: IT. ,3^2*
•Calendar^ Months
Effective Date: 1988-89 School Year

Time/FTE: .
Full ( 1 . 0 )
Step/Lane/Code: 6-B
Pay Period Base: Biweekly 1
Vacation (12 Month contracts only):

Monthly

Y

^Salary to be adjusted per 1988-39 negotiations.
You are tentatively assigned to:

Hi ohl anrj-Phvsical S c i e n c e

Upon approval by the Board, this becomes a contractual agreement and you should not sign it unless you are
able and intend to fulfill your part of the agreement, including reporting for work on all of the days designated
in the calendar, except leave days as provided by the policies and regulations of the Board of Education. You
may not sign another contract while this one is in force. If this offer of employment is acceptable to you and you
are confident that you can £ \lfill the terms and conditions expressed herein^ you ahould sign and return it to
reach the Personnel Office within (5) five days.
Before this contract is effective, the employee aball furnish the following (CHECKED) documents which
must be acceptable to the Board of Education:
A Physical ETaminatkm Report by a doctor of medicine on A form provided by the Board at the employee's
expense
xx
. A Tuberculin Test
i2!L . An Enrollment Form for Utaii State EetiremerttSysiem
xx
. A W-4Ixxx*me Tax Withholding Form
2 2 L InmirmiK^ Registration F ^
xx
A copy of the employee's Social Security Card«d Driver's license (or photo LD. card)
2S2L FormI-9
XX— Valid Teaching Certificate for Utah sppropriaiBlo aaaignment
XX— Of&aai Transcripts) of credits and evidean of all acquired aradamic degrees (Must include the
institution, date, mujorfo) and minors) of eecWegree)
State Annual Information Sheet
Verification of prior experience
Documentation of Military Service
License or Permit.
Other Documentation.

AdministratorfarPersonnel Services
"" / ' ^
I accept the offer indicated above and agreetoabide by the policies and procedures of the Board of
Education, and I agree that I. will give the Sc&ool District thirty days' advance notice in writing of my
resignation (for classified personnel fifteen dayi*notice shall be given).
Signed

^"\^ £ ^ >Q"t/v<

/.

/ / fltx^-ul

Date f.- J 1 - %Z
Address

/." ' / t" fC

/ £ QQ <,

City

/JQU,:/.^,.

I State (Hc{\

Zip ?, ''/0 I 0

Soc. Security » 5Z<{- <?•/• jf'/YC Blrthdate /£- - 2 - 5" *>" (Mon-Day-Yr) Phone 0 ?f<2
NOTE: 9-month personnel paid monthly must ttfect a 12-pay or a 10-pay schedule:
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Gregory T. Ambus
649 E. 1600 S.
B o u n t i f u l , Utah 84010
801-252-3340

August 24, 1988

James R. Moss Superintendent
Utah S t a t e Board of Education
250 East 500 South
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84 111

Dear Dr.

Moss,

I am requesting an emergency meeting wit* you or the Utah State Board of Education.
I have submitted to Dr.- Mourltsen copiesof the Hearing Decision which was held
before Garth Mangum May 19, 1987. * Hav i ng rev t ewed some of the file concerning the
revocation of my certificate, I did not respond to the notices because ,1 did not —
receive them. 1 was in Arizona coaching and teaching and Granite School District"
as well aware of my address.
I have also submitted pages 22-27 of,a nangh draft of my attorney's memorandum
concerning our current court .case.- These pdgei^eview our situation concerning
the hearing process for educators and'Ut* statute 53-51-7.
I have written this letter to request tbis emergency meeting based on winning the
above mentioned hearing, being hired inSaft'Lake School* District, and being denied
the ability to teach there. The hearing process with Dr. Mangum should allow me to
keep my Utah Teaching Certificate, and to accept the position With Salt lake District.

Thank You for your time in reviewing this matter.

Sincerely,

Gregory T. Ambus

MFESSIONAlY PRACTICES Y

COMMISSION

250 E—i FJU So-tl Sto^c<

Bosch
}*SS S<H/lh Kid<T4 H i l l s

ADVISORY \

SJt U c City. UuJL.

September 26, 1988

Bountiful, UT 84010
0»n M. Wc)}$
YK*-Ch*f rman
Cleveland,
UT 84518
DmUe «. 0*nieU
RfO 3 Box 212
So^r,'.;.»; fork. LT £4660
^ U 0. Oye
Rl. 1 fto* 134 2
Roosevelt. UT 84066
t . Art £lc*6*j«r
U87 £*st Soo Uf*
Un<ly, UT 84052
to*4l1e S. £ngUnd
'20 Tule Circle
w i t , UT 84074
Lohn L. J*«ixi
ox S23

o 4 l v 1 U e , UT 84017
•I I . MUoeJoviky
6 £. Thumdertlrd Dr.
. I t Uk*. City, UT 8410$
iul J. Rasb+rHj
IS £ t s t S20 Kcrth
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Gregory T. Ambus
649 East 1600 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Dear Mr. Ambus:
A hearing to consider reinstatement of your teaching
certificate has bee* scheduled before a panel of the Utah
Professional Practices Advisory Commission. The list of the
names of the individuals assigned to hear your case is
enclosed. The hearing will be held Thursday, October 6,
1988, in the West Board Room of the Utah State Office of
Education, 250 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
beginning at 2:00 pj*.
Should you be unable to meet at the time and place scheduled
or if you object to any member of the hearing panel, please
notify us immediately. Otherwise, we will expect you to be
in attendance. Yoimay bring legal counsel and any
witnesses or others that you wish to have testify in your
behalf. We have enclosed a copy of our Rules of Procedure
for Hearing Complaints.
If you have any question regarding procedure for the
hearing, please let«e know.

C. Mouritsen,Ph.D.
tive Secretary
RCM:rm
Enclosures
S t i l e Office of £duc*Uon
740

cc:

tephen W. C o * , Attorney at Law
Twila Bringhurst (secretary to the
State Board of Education)
William Christapulos, Granite School District

84UI

^r
STEPHEN W. COOK
ROBERT H. V/IUDE
RONALD £. KUNZ

COOK AND WILDE
A r§i0tM0^

LAW

o o * ^ ™

6925 UNIOK PARK CENTER. SUITE 490
NOOVALE. UTAH 84047

JOHN K. RICE
_
NICHOLAS J. ANCELIDES

TELEPHONE 80J-255-6O00
' f/-**™
PAV
fAX 801-561-W29

RE1DC. D A V I S

September 27, 1988

Dr. Roger C. Mouritsen, Executive Secretary
Utah Professional Practices Advisory Commission
State Office of Education
250 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

Gregory T- Ambus

Dear Dr. Mouritsen:
As your file reflect*, I represent Gregory T« Ambus.
I am in -receipt of a letter addressed to Mr* Ambus dated
September 22, 1988 from jou. Based upon the facts set
forth below, as I understand them, the purpose of this
letter is to request that Mr- Ambus1 certificate be
immediately restored to turn pending a new de novo due
process hearing to revoke such certificate if such is
still* desired.
The following are the facts as I understand them:
(a) On July-30, 1981 Mr. Ambus registered•his
address with the Board of Education as 3316 El Serrito
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109.
(b) For approximately four years, until January
23, 1987, Mr. Ambus was ^ployed with the Granite School
District. As of that date, Mr. Ambus1 address was 831
Stratford Avenue, Salt Lafae City, Utah 84106.
(c) Since Janiwy 23, 1987, to the present,
many school officials knew where Mr. Ambus resided, or
where he could be contacted, and knew that he was
represented by me, as his counsel, in litigation pending
before the United States District Court for the District
of Utah.

Dr. Roger C. Mouritsen, Executive Secretary
September 27, 1988
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(d) On March 18, 1988, two years after the
alleged event, Dr. Mouritsen filed a complaint before the
U.P.P.A.C. because, "Information was received indicating
that Gregory Ambus was charged with two counts of drug
distribution and one count of drug selling, stemming from
alleged marijuana exchanges wi.th or witnessed by a police
informant.M
(e) The Complaint of Dr. Mouritsen was sent to
831 Stratford Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. Apparently,
Granite School District provided this address. Such
correspondence was returned by the post office.
(f) On April ilf 1988, Dr. Mouritsen sent a
Notice of Hearing to 831 Stratford Avenue, Salt" Lake City,
Utah 84105. Such correspondence was returned unclaimed.
(g) Mr. Ambus never received the correspondence
described above.
(h) Apparent If on May 20, 1988, a hearing of
some unknown kind was heW and a recommendation to suspend
was provided.
(i) On August IS, 1988, the State Board of
Education revoked Mr. Ambus* certificate.
(j) On August 24, 1988, Mr. Ambus requested
immediate review by the State Board of Education.
(k) Apparentlf the State Board of Education
referred the matter back before the U.P.P.A.C.
(1) As I understand Dr. Mouritsen's jctter
dated September 26, 1988, the hearing now scheduled for
October 6, 1988, is not ade novo due process hearing.
Rather, it is a hearing to "consider reinstatement" of Mr.
Ambus f certificate.

Dr. Roger C. Mouritsen, Executive Secretary
September 27, 1988
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With the above facts in mind, I would suggest that
Mr. Ambus1 certificate be reinstated immediately and that,
if still requested by the Complainant, a hearing be held
to determine whether the certificate be revoked.
First, Section 53-50-J2.5 U.C.A. (3953), as amended,
requests that written notice of hearing be sent Mto the
last known address and to the address shown on the records
of the commission . . . -~ [emphasis added]. Such was not
done in this case and my client never received any notice
of the hearing.
Second, both by constitutional and statutory
prescription, my client is entitled to due process before
his certificate is revoked and not after,
I would like to resolve this issue immediately and
short of judicial interveation. Would you please have your
counsel contact me immediately should any questions exist.
Sincerely,

8£JbdiAS t e p h e n W. Cook
SWC:dn
cc:

G r e g o r y T. Ambus

EXHIBIT
H

STEPHEN W. COOK, USB #0720
COOK & WILDE, P.C.
Attorneys for Respondent
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 255-6000
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
UTAH PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES ADVISORY COMMISSION
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
Claimant.
NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS
vs,
GREGORY T. AMBUS,
Respondent.

The Respondent, Gregory T. Ambus, by and through his
counsel, hereby provides formal notice of objections to the
present proceeding:
1.

Lack of Due Process:

Prior Revocation Notices.

On March 18, 1988, Roger C. Mouritsen filed a Complaint
with the U.P.P.A.C. against the Respondent.

A copy of the

Complaint was mailed to Respondent at 831 Stratford Avenue
which was never received by the Respondent and which was
returned to the U.P.P.A.C

On April 11, 1988, a notice of

hearing was sent to the Respondent to the same address,

which apparently was not received and was returned again as
described above.

A hearing was held on May 20, 1988 and

the U.P.P.A.C recommended that the Respondent's Certificate
be suspended.

The State Board of Education revoked his

certificate on August 19, 1988 for unprofessional behavior.
Mr. Ambus first learned of this action on August 24, 1988
when he was-suspended from teaching in the Salt Lake School
District.
The Respondent personally and through his counsel have
notified the U.P.P.A.C. that the Respondent was not given
actual notice of "the proceedings.

Both have notified the

State Board of Education and the U.P.P.A.C. that the
Respondent's right to due process has been violated and has
demanded that his certificate to teach be restored prior to
any further hearings.

The Respondent therefore objects to

these proceedings until his certificate is returned.
Cleveland Board of Education vs. Loudermill, 479 U.S. 532
(1985); Pease v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d &yf

(Utah

1983); and Worrall v. Oqden City, 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980).
2.

Lack of Due Process:

Present Hearing Notices.

Despite the Respondent's requests to do so, the Respondent
has not received any notice of any specific issue to be

-2-

decided in these proceedings.

There is no question that

the Respondent is entitled to such notice.

Section

63-460-3 U.C.A. (1953), as amended; Nelson v. Jacobsen,
supra; Worrall v. Ogden City, supra.

In addition, Utahfs

Administrative Procedure Act has not been followed in many
respects as provided by low.

For example, see Section

63-46(.b)-3(2) U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
3.

Lack of Due Process:

Constitutionality of Section

53A-6-104 U.C.A. (1953), as amended.

The Respondent

objects to any proceedings based upon such statute because
the same is unconstitutionally void.

Burton v. Cascade

School District Union High School No. 5, 512 F.2d 850 (9th
Cir. 1975); State v. Musser, 223 P.2d 193 (Utah 1950).
4. _ Statute of Limitations-*— This action is barred by
the applicable statute of limitations, Section 78-12-29 (2)
U.C.A. (1953) as amended5.

Expungement-

No action may be taken against the

Respondent due to any events associated with the charges
which were filed against the Respondent which were
dismissed, expunged, and sealed.

Such actions are binding

upon the State Superintendent as a State entity and as a
State official Section 7^-18-2 U.C.A. (1953) as amended.
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Moreover, the alleged offense was non job related and
consideration may only be given to job related convictions
Section 53A-3-410(4) U.C.A. (1953), as amended.

An

unproved offense is no basis for State action in revoking a
certificate.
6.

Objection to Committee and Presiding Officer,

JJpon information and belief, the presiding officer and
members of the Committee were on the same committee which
recommended suspension of the Respondent's certificate on
May 20, 1988.

The Respondent is entitled to a fair and

impartial presiding officer and committee members.
DATED this

2Q

day of October, 1988.

STEPHEN W. COOK

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of the
f o r e g o i n g N o t i c e of O b j e c t i o n s was h a n d - d e l i v e r e d ,
P r e s i d i n g Officer,
October,

G a i l Miadejovoky,

this

0^

day

t o the
of -

1988-

SIAAL
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